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 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the United States Court of*
International Trade, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 07-4776
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHARLES MCCORMICK,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-00075)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 21, 2008
________________
Before: BARRY and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI , Judge*
Opinion Filed: December 17, 2008
_______________
OPINION
_______________
RESTANI, Judge.
2In this appeal, Charles McCormick challenges his sentence of 33 months for a
three-count wire fraud conviction as unreasonable.  We will affirm the sentence.
The facts of the underlying crime are well-known to the parties and we will not
repeat them here.  The sentence is within the range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines and that calculation is not challenged.  McCormick also concedes that the
court identified mitigating facts as it recounted the factors it was required to consider
under 18  U.S.C. § 3553(a).  McCormick’s argument, rather, is that that consideration was
formulaic and that the court placed undo emphasis on his criminal history and the
seriousness of the offense.
Where the court has so clearly considered the statutory factors and cited to the
specific evidence of record for potential mitigation, it is difficult to conclude the court did
not follow proper procedure.  That the court was moved by prior criminal history and the
seriousness of the offense, nonetheless, to select a sentence at the high end of the
guideline range does not establish an abuse of discretion.  We conclude that the sentence
was a reasonable one and will affirm the District Court’s Judgment and Conviction Order.
